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Stone and Rielage: The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917

The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern
Front, 1914–1917, by David R. Stone. Lawrence:
Univ. Press of Kansas, 2015. 368 pages. $34.95
(Kindle $19.99).

With the centennial of World War I,
interested readers can choose from
among a surging wave of new books
about the World War I experience and
its impact on modern history. Most
of these have focused on the western
front, but a small number reexamine the
war in Eastern Europe. Among these,
David Stone’s The Russian Army in the
Great War is the first new historical
overview of the Russian military on the
eastern front since Norman Stone’s The
Eastern Front, 1914–1917 was published
forty years ago. With the fall of the
Soviet Union, historians have enjoyed
more access to Russian archives and
accounts of the war. While this new
research is already familiar to specialists,
Stone sets out to make it accessible to
the general reader. He is clear from
the outset that his work is a military
history, so while social and economic
factors frame military operations, they
are not the focus of the volume.
Most general histories of World War I
describe the Russian army in a narrative
of failure. The “Russian steamroller,”
feared by its adversaries for its huge but
slow-to-mobilize peasant armies, fails
owing to poor leadership and equipment, setting the stage for chaos and
revolution. While conceding the Russian
army’s failings, Stone asserts that
focusing solely on the negative ignores
essential historical context. Four empires
(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and
the Ottoman Empire) went to war in
Eastern Europe—and none of their royal
houses survived the experience. All four
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empires experienced military failure,
hunger, economic and social collapse,
and loss of territory. The Russian
experience was unique only in that the
subsequent civil war led to an enduring
Communist regime. On the battlefield,
Russian troops generally performed
as well as the Austro-Hungarian units
that were their primary adversaries
in the first half of the war. Only when
fighting German troops were Russian
units clearly outclassed. Stone observes,
however, that no nation consistently
matched the quality of the German army
on a unit-against-unit basis. The Russian
army was plagued by a lack of artillery,
machine guns, and ammunition—as
was every army in the war. No military
had anticipated fully the requirements
of modern industrial warfare, and
entire societies were mobilized to meet
these sudden demands, with varying
degrees of success. Russia’s industrial
mobilization was less successful than
some, but what success it achieved
was notable considering the country’s
relatively backward starting point.
The Russian army’s first moves in the
war are remembered for the defeat
of two Russian armies at the battle of
Tannenberg—often the only eastern
front battle nonspecialists can name.
Tannenberg has been remembered in
part because the two victorious German commanders, Hindenburg and
Ludendorff, later emerged to lead the
overall German war effort. Less appreciated is that at the same time the Russian
army achieved significant initial success
against Austria-Hungary. These territorial gains were reversed in 1915, as the
Russian army endured the series of defeats known as “the long retreat.” Despite
this reversal, however, the Russian army
remained intact and effective. In 1916, it
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launched major offensives, coordinated
with its allies, to divert German forces
from combat on the western front. In the
process, the Russian army pushed deep
into Austria-Hungary and essentially
removed the Austro-Hungarian army
from the war as an effective fighting
force. Subsequent Austrian resistance
would continue only because of direct
support by German army units.
Readers generally familiar with the war
on the eastern front will enjoy Stone’s
coverage of campaigns in the Carpathian
Mountains and on the Turkish front, as
well as the disastrous impact on Russia
of Romanian entry into the war on the
Allied side. Stone’s previous research
on the early Soviet military allows
him to identify continuity between
the imperial and Soviet militaries and
frame how the new Soviet army drew
lessons from World War I combat.
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Combat on the eastern front was more
mobile than the trench warfare in the
west. This is a story in which terrain
matters, and most of it is not familiar.
In this context, the book suffers from
the generally low quality of its maps.
For the reader already versed in the
events of late imperial Russian history,
The Russian Army in the Great War
fills a gap by explaining the nuances
of military events. If, however, these
events are unfamiliar, or if the reader
is more interested in the interplay of
military, economic, and social factors, a broader history of Russia
in World War I, such as W. Bruce
Lincoln’s Passage through Armageddon,
would be a better starting point.
DALE C. RIELAGE

OUR REVIEWERS

David A. Cooper has served as chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval
War College since 2010 and holds a faculty appointment as the James V. Forrestal Professor of National Security Affairs. He is a graduate of Oberlin College, has a master’s degree in international
affairs from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, and holds a PhD in
political science and international relations from the Australian National University.
Roger H. Ducey is an associate professor at the Naval War College, teaching in the National Security Affairs Department. He specializes in the areas of leadership, decision making, and negotiation.
A command pilot, he commanded the 99th Air Refueling Squadron, the 319th Support Group,
and the 319th Air Expeditionary Group (Provisional) deployed in support of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM from 2001 to 2002. He served on the headquarters staffs of the Strategic
Air Command and the Air Mobility Command. He holds a bachelor’s of business administration
degree in international finance from the University of Miami and master’s degrees in aviation
management from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and in national security and strategic
studies from the Naval War College.
Andrew S. Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department
at the Naval War College and a member of the department’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/15

NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 159

2

2/22/17 9:32 AM

